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‘It must be considered that there is nothing more difﬁcult to carry out, nor
more doubtful of success, nor more dangerous to handle, than to initiate a
new order of things.’ Machiavelli, The Prince
Central Xinzheng Reform and the Twentieth-Century Chinese
State
The effort of the Qing dynasty to transform itself and forge a new
set of relationships with society in its last decade has been one of
the less explored areas in the scholarship on modern China.
Although this set of radical initiatives, collectively known as the
xinzheng (‘New Policy’) reforms attracted a good deal of commentary
from its contemporaries, until recently it has been relatively under-
studied.1 There are two reasons for this neglect. First, conventional
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errors and omissions are, of course, my own.
1 Although the xinzheng period has been well covered by two superb monographs
on the transformation of Chinese education in the early 20th century—Sally
Borthwick, Education and Social Change in China: The Beginnings of the Modern Era
(Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1983); Paul Bailey, Reform the People: Changing
Attitudes towards Popular Education in Early Twentieth Century China (Edinburgh: Edin-
burgh University Press, 1990), until the 1990s there were only three major works on
the xinzheng period that even partly covered the reforms from a central government
perspective: Meribeth Cameron, The Reform Movement in China, 1898–1911
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1931); Mary Wright’s Introduction in China
in Revolution: The First Phase (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1968), and Chuzo
Ichiko, ‘Political and Institutional Reform, 1901–11’ in John K. Fairbank and K. C.
Liu, Cambridge History of China, vol. 1, part 2 (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press). Happily, in the 1990s a generation of younger scholars began to publish on
this period, with Roger R. Thompson, China’s Local Councils in the Age of Reform, 1898–
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periodization has divided historical turf between Qing historians (for
the Qing dynasty 1644–1911), Republican historians (for the period
between 1911 and 1949) and political scientists (who cover 1949
to the present). Second, since the dramatic narrative for the ﬁrst
three-quarters of the twentieth century has been largely understood
as a process of ever more radical forms of revolutionary change,
scholars have understandably been more taken with exploring the
antecedents of revolution and/or locally based studies of elite trans-
formation than they have been with exploring a case of seemingly
bona ﬁde failure. The central government-initiated xinzheng reform
period (1902–1911) has thus borne the full brunt of a Whiggish
interpretation of history; too late to command the attention of most
Qing historians, too early for the majority of Republican historians,
at best a prologue for the real revolution to come, and at worst an
abortive failure.
This gap in the historiography has had the unfortunate effect of
obscuring wider understanding of the origins and evolution of the
twentieth century, ‘modern’ Chinese state. As the title of Mary
Wright’s still relevant volume from 1968 suggests, China’s ‘century
of revolution’ began as much from above as it did from below in the
immediate aftermath of the Boxer debacle. For questions concerning
state building and institutional transformation, one could go further.
The xinzheng era between 1902 and 1911 is the key watershed in
the transformation of the Chinese state into something recognizably
‘modern’, for it is not until this time that the central government
unambiguously altered its agenda to become the leading player in
the search for ‘wealth and power’. This fundamental shift of agenda
sharply reversed over a century of de facto devolution of informal
administrative authority and initiative to both regional viceroys and
local elites, and required a thorough transformation of the central
state’s ethos and organization if it were to establish a much more
proactive presence and take on a new set of tasks. These new tasks
ranged widely, and included much augmented military moderniza-
tion, the complete reorganization of the central bureaucracy, the
belated promotion of modern education and commerce, investment
in infrastructure, and the attempt to work through a new set of rela-
tionships with provincial and local elites through constitutional
1911 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1995) and Douglas Reynolds, China,
1898–1912: The Xinzheng Revolution and Japan (Cambridge: Harvard University
Press, 1993) as excellent examples of this newer generation of work.
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reform. In short, the xinzheng program was nothing less than an
attempted revolution from above.
Political analysts from Machiavelli to Samuel Huntington have
noted that political reform from above is a venture fraught with risk,
as it invariably carries the potential to mobilize blocking conservative
opposition from within and/or raise expectations that cannot be sat-
isﬁed by the system’s ongoing capacity to deliver.2 Indeed, in the ﬁrst
decade of the twentieth century, the conditions could hardly have
been less favorable for thoroughgoing reform from above. The Qing
had just been humiliatingly defeated in the Boxer Rebellion. Its cent-
ral government was ﬁscally crippled by harsh indemnity payments to
foreign powers and a high rate of foreign debt, it commanded but
weak extractive capacity despite half a century of proliferating locally
based informal state organizations that exacted fees and payments
from the peasantry without supervision and auditing by the formal
bureaucracy, and it had but little input into the ‘modern’ schools
springing up in a variety of locations. Given these objective circum-
stances and immediate structural constraints, it should come as no
great surprise that in the medium run, the combination of too much
promise, too little institutional capacity for delivering on those prom-
ises, and the eventual defection of the dynasty’s natural base of sup-
port overcame both the xinzheng reforms and the dynasty itself.
But in another less obvious, but perhaps more lasting way, the
xinzheng program was not a swan song for a historical era about to
pass; it laid the groundwork for another to come. Once the Six
Boards were reorganized into the precursors of modern ministries
and the Confucian civil service examinations were abolished, there
was no question of returning to the old order. In so deﬁnitively
breaking with the past and recasting the role and functions of the
central governmnent, the xinzheng reforms laid down a basic agenda
for central state action that virtually all of the Qing’s successor
regimes of the twentieth century would imitate and struggle to
achieve, albeit through a variety of different tactics. Well after 1911,
military modernization for national defense, modern education,
more effective systems of taxation and extraction, the promotion of
infrastructural projects, and mobilizing the support of ‘the people’
would all continue to feature as key state-building projects, irrespect-
2 Niccolo Machiavelli, The Prince and the Discourses (New York: Modern Library,
1950), pp. 21–2; Samuel Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New
Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), pp. 148–66, and passim.
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ive of regime. Perhaps the most important and lasting set of xinzheng
initiatives was the unitary central government’s attempt to augment
its institutional capacity to project its authority both further and
more systematically into provinces and sub-provincial level in order
to carry out this ever larger range of state action. Provincial and
local elites may have contested the central government’s aspirations
(and indeed much of the politics of the late xinzheng and early Repub-
lican periods can be understood in this light), but from the xinzheng
period on, all central government ﬁgures—whether military, Guom-
indang, or Chinese Communist Party—would, with absolute consist-
ency, claim the unitary and indivisible nature of the Chinese state,
ceaselessly reiterate the central executive’s legitimacy in making
appropriate decisions for the whole, and initiate any number of
actions to translate those ideals into reality.
In addition to its pro-active legacy of central government aspira-
tions to state building and a range of speciﬁc initiatives from military
modernization to modern education, the xinzheng era also be-
queathed to its successors a complex of structural dilemmas that the
dynasty had either unwittingly unleashed or proved unable to
reverse; notably the ongoing reduction of the central government’s
share in the real amount of taxes and fees being collected,3 and the
beginnings of institutional disjointedness within the central bureau-
cracy as different models and methods of appointment were
imported into different functional areas.
One indication of the period’s lasting relevance can be seen
through the reformers’ own diagnoses of the state’s most serious
problems, and the ‘cultural lenses’ through which they perceived
desirable solutions. After returning from the Government Reform
Commission (1905–06) to investigate political systems abroad, Dai
Hongci and Duan Feng jointly memorialized with a set of recom-
mendations for government reform (gai guanzhi) in August 1906.
They stated quite forcefully that the effective implementation of con-
stitutionalism in China would ﬁrst require a lengthy period of gov-
ernment reform—as had been the case in Meiji Japan. Getting the
state in sufﬁcient order ﬁrst, appropriate state-led education of the
people second, and constitutionaly based participation a distant third
thus ﬁgured in the earliest twentieth century discussions of how to
3 Esther Morrison, The Modernization of the Ch’ing Bureaucracy (Radcliffe University,
Ph.D. dissertation, 1959); Paul Hickey, ‘Fee Taking, Salary Reform, and the Struc-
ture of State Power in Late Qing China, 1909–11’, Modern China 17:3, pp. 389–417.
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remake the Chinese central state from above. This rank ordering of
priorities went on to ﬁgure prominently in the political philosophy
of Sun Zhongshan and his heirs in the Party-states of the 1930s,
1940s and beyond.
In a line of reasoning that neatly captured the key institution-
building dilemma that would plague the Chinese state for decades
thereafter, the Dai/Duan memorial stated ‘without ﬁrst reforming
ofﬁcialdom, individuals hold sway rather than laws; [if] ofﬁcialdom
is ﬁrst reformed, law will be hold sway rather than individuals’—and
that the latter was a far preferable state of affairs to the former,
because the law [if ﬁrst institutionalized] would be autonomously
effective irrespective of the individual in ofﬁce. The memorial con-
tinued to outline a set of outstanding problems with state institutions
that could serve as a diagnostic checklist for the central state’s key
deﬁciencies for the remainder of the century: the need 1) for a
responsible cabinet in order to unify central administration; 2) for a
clear demarcation in the functions and responsibilities of central and
local government; 3) for a clearly deﬁned corps of assistant ofﬁcials
to relieve the work burden on responsible ofﬁcials; 4) for functional
rationalization, clear delineation of work responsibilities between
specialists within the different organizations in the central bureau-
cracy and amalgamation or abolition of redundant state organiza-
tions such as the Board of Rites; 5) for thorough reform of local
government to be more responsive to the needs of the people; 6) for
the central government to work in partnership with local govern-
ments to increase the ﬂow of tax revenue; 7) to provide established
channels of upward mobility for clerks and petty assistant ofﬁcials in
the central bureaucracy to cut down on malfeasance, and 8) to sim-
plify the (civil service) personnel system of appointment, transfer,
promotion and emolument.4 With the possible exception of item 7
(at present the corruption of full ofﬁcials with discretionary access
to permits and funds is considered to be an even more serious prob-
lem than the malfeasance of undersalaried petty clerks), each of
these is still an ongoing source of concern for the contemporary
Chinese state. Despite a century of revolution and reform, ofﬁcial
responsibilities remain blurred, individuals continue to have inﬂu-
ence beyond the statutory scope of the ofﬁces they inhabit, much of
4 ‘Chushi geguo kaocha zhengzhi dachen Dai Hongci deng zou qing gaiding
quanguo guanzhi yiwei xianyu zhe’, Guangxu 32, 12/6. In Qingmo Choubei Lixian
Dang’an Shiliao (Beijing: Zhonghua Shuju, 1979), pp. 367–82.
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the real tax that falls on the countryside is collected through unmon-
itored and only semi-formalized extrabudgetary revenue, the
demarcation of responsibility between central and local governments
and between different layers of local government continues to be
vague in statute and even vaguer in practice, and informal arrange-
ments (if not outright corruption) throughout the bureaucracy are
endemic.
The xinzheng attempts to reform late imperial bureaucracy were
simultaneously framed by the cultural and institutional environment
of the late Confucian order while bequeathing a set of symbolic and
institutional legacies of remarkable staying power to the post-Qing
twentieth-century state. The civil bureaucracy was an integral com-
ponent of this attempt to recast long-standing political and social
institutions in order to carry out a fundamentally transformed vision
of the state, and as such can be seen as a veritable microcosm of
xinzheng aspirations and shortcomings. Throughout the 1902–1912
period, the civil bureaucracy was simultaneously the object of xin-
zheng reform (through a series of initiative for gradualist reform fol-
lowed by the abrupt cancellation of the civil service examinations in
1904–05) as well as a critical prospective agent and eventual imple-
mentor of xinzheng reform (in actively implementing the sorts of initi-
atives the reforms envisioned for the central state—without a com-
petent and loyal bureaucracy the state’s new agendas could not
possibly be carried out).
The founding document of xinzheng, the Edict on Reform promul-
gated by Ci Xi on January 8, 1901 in effect stated as much:
the ﬁrst essential, even more important than devising new systems, is to
secure men of administrative ability (zhi ren). Without new systems, the old
systems cannot be saved; without men of ability, even good systems cannot
be made to succeed.5
The simple indispensability of the central bureaucracy to the xin-
zheng project renders it a signiﬁcant subject for study in its own right,
but the xinzheng era attempts to reform the bureaucracy also shed
light on wider issues of continuity and change for the twentieth-
century Chinese state. The xinzheng program looked abroad to for-
eign models in its reform of guanzhi (the ofﬁcial system/the
bureaucracy) as much as in any other arena of reform. But unlike
5 The Edict on Reform of January 29, 1901 is the founding document of the
xinzheng reforms. It is reproduced in Guangxu Chao Donghua Lu, Vol. 4, pp. 135–6,
and is translated in full in Reynolds, pp. 201–4.
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modern police, postal systems, or commerce bureaus that could be
created more or less from the ground up, the late imperial state
already possessed a long history and developed repertoire for
recruiting, evaluating, and rewarding civilian ofﬁcials. In perhaps no
other realm of state action was there such a paradoxical pull towards
both the past and the future; and in no other realm of state reform
save the military did the state’s efforts to simultaneously centralize
and push through a new curriculum lead to such unintended cata-
strophic results in terms of institutional fraying and eventual
breakdown.
Key legitimating symbols of civilian ofﬁcialdom like the keju civil
service examinations remained stubbornly resistant to change des-
pite the rapidly changing social and institutional context of the early
twentieth century. Despite the sudden abrogation of the Confucian
keju civil service examinations in late 1904 as unreformable and
inappropriate for the needs of a modern country, centrally adminis-
tered and monitored ‘new’ civil service examinations reappeared only
two years later, and continued to be held in different forms until the
end of the dynasty. In addition, a well deﬁned set of tropes about
‘virtue and talent’ (de yu cai) and ‘upright and capable’ (jian neng)
ofﬁcials continued to shape the range of the imaginable and desir-
able for civil service reform—with profoundly tenacious afterlives
in the subsequent Republican period. These almost unchallengeable
assumptions about the natural legitimacy and fairness of a ‘career
open to talent’ through centrally legitimated and/or administered
open civil service examinations, and the importance of the ‘virtuous
and talented’ ofﬁcial as key to creating a modern and powerful China
continued to resonate throughout the remainder of the twentieth
century despite the implosion of the state under warlordism, the rise
of the Party-state in the 1920s and 1930s, invasion and civil war,
and more extreme phases of revolution from above and below on
both sides of the Taiwan Straits.
Redeﬁning the ‘Virtuous and Talented’ Ofﬁcial
Confucian state doctrine had long assumed that good ofﬁcials needed
to possess both personal morality (de) and objectively effective ability
(neng or cai) in some sort of balance. The normal way in which the
late imperial state both conferred status and selected for individuals
of sufﬁcient ‘virtue and talent’ was through regularly scheduled,
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murderously competitive civil service examinations held at the local,
provincial and metropolitan levels, and it was presumed that the
long years of study that examination success required would ipso facto
simultaneously socialize individuals into the ethical norms of virtue.
‘Talent’ was similarly deﬁned in a quite loose way: it tended to be
reduced to a working deﬁnition of ‘administrative effectiveness’—
effectiveness given the limited range and aspirations of the late
imperial agrarian state.
Of course, the harsh examination regime of late imperial China
did not necessarily produce ‘virtue and talent’; in practice it at least
as often produced pedantry and generated an enormous amount of
waste, as the overwhelming majority of those who studied for the
examinations never qualiﬁed for ofﬁce. From the Tang dynasty on,
examinations were continually criticized on grounds of ineffect-
iveness; the heavily classical curriculum forced examinees to ‘study
things they will never use and later use what they never have studied
(suoxi fei suoyong, suoyong fei suoxi)’.6 Elman suggests that in fact, the
purpose of the ‘examination life’ was less to select virtue and talent
for public life than it was to bind the state and local elites into a
common literati culture, institutionalize and standardize the impar-
tial selection of the latter, and transform the literatus into a political
servant of the people and the ruler.7 But whatever the practical
objections to the examination system—and they were many both
before the xinzheng era and during it—the trope of the virtuous and
talented ofﬁcial remained unchanged, as did the positively charged
norm of impersonal and fair selection through something very much
like the keju system. What changed radically during the xinzheng
period was what ‘talent’ came to mean: how it was redeﬁned, what
it speciﬁcally denoted, and which institutions were deemed appropri-
ate to deﬁne and validate its standards. The xinzheng decade wit-
nessed an extraordinary acceleration on three fronts. First, the very
deﬁnition of ‘talent’ was invested with new content—technical know-
ledge of speciﬁcally ‘modern’ Western subjects. Second, the inculca-
tion of both moralistic ‘virtue’ (de) and functional ‘talent’ was
increasingly handed into the remit of ‘new schools’ (jiaotang), with
appropriate topping up of functional knowledge and skill at institu-
6 Cited in Benjamin Elman, A Cultural History of Civil Examinations in Late Imperial
China (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000), p. 213.
7 Ibid., pp. xxviii–xxix, pp. 123–4, 240–1 and passim, 371–2.
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tions of higher learning overseas. And third, the domestic institu-
tions that deﬁned, standardized and conferred status to the ‘talen-
ted’ became increasingly fragmented, disjointed and out of sync with
each other.
Of course, none of this was clear at the outset of the xinzheng
reforms. Despite its landmark status in the annals of radical reform
from above, the Reform Edict of January 1901 was couched in gener-
alities as to the appropriate mix of ‘blending together the best of the
Chinese and the foreign’. The question of how ‘real talent’ (zhencai)
should be determined was left vague, and some of its passages sug-
gested a real reluctance to shortchange virtue and ethics: ‘if a per-
son’s shortcomings or strengths are disregarded . . . then reform will
become nothing more than empty words.’ The Reform Edict settled
on a comforting sounding formula of appropriate balance between
principle and practical knowledge, as ‘newly arrived ofﬁcials [are
keen to] discuss wealth and power, but are often confused [about
ethics], while Confucian ofﬁcials talk about ethics, but don’t grasp
[practical] affairs.’8
But once the Reform Edict had broken the post-1898 moratorium
on discussion of systemic reforms within the central government,
later policy recommendations had no such ambivalence about down-
grading the relative importance of virtue in the previously fused and
indivisible trope of ‘virtue and talent’ for aspiring ofﬁcials. ‘Talent’
(cai/ rencai) was invested with a new, and lasting set of connotations:
expert and technical knowledge of ‘modern’ subjects. The ﬁrst major
memorial on this topic was a joint Zhang Zhidong/Liu Kunyi memor-
ial in July 1901, which explicitly equated ‘talent’ (rencai) with
modern topics, and proposed a complete overhaul of the educational
system in order to train such talent: ‘in seeking men of ability for
the realization of a better administration . . . unless men of ability
are trained it is impossible to strive for survival; unless schools are
opened, it is impossible to train men of ability.’9 Meanwhile, ques-
tions of virtue and morality were shunted into the discussions and
debates on modern education for the remainder of the xinzheng
period. Such was the early conﬁdence in modern education that
reformers presumed that new schools would take on the inculcation
8 ‘Shangyu’, op. cit.
9 Translated in Wolfgang Franke, The Reform and Abolition of the Traditional Chinese
Examination System (Center for East Asian Studies, Harvard, 1960), p. 52.
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of proper de through continuing to teach a modiﬁed form of the
Chinese classics in combination with ‘honoring the monarch, Con-
fucius, the public good, and a martial spirit.’10
The recasting of the content of ‘talent and ability’ to mean tech-
nical competence and functional knowledge in modern subjects, and
the effective channeling of this new form of talent into the realm of
ofﬁcialdom posed a real challenge in terms of supply and institu-
tional coordination. Not only did a large reservoir of technical talent
have to be created with all due speed, but new career paths had to
be established for the recruitment and promotion of that talent into
the bureaucracy almost as soon as the ‘new talent’ became available.
Generating a sufﬁciently large supply of talent, as well as the institu-
tional coordination between different state institutions to credential
and recruit that talent led to a range of ultimately political problems
that the counselors of 1901–04 had not entirely anticipated. Rapidly
increasing the supply of ‘talent’ was achieved through two initiatives:
sending large numbers of Chinese students to study abroad, particu-
larly to Japan, and promoting the creation of a standardized system
of modern schools throughout the Empire.
Throughout the xinzheng period, the numbers of Chinese students in
Japan burgeoned out of control, jumping from zero in 1900 to around
8,000 in 1905, and possibly peaking as high as 12,000 in 1906 before
dropping to around 4,000 at the end of the decade. Unfortunately, a
signiﬁcant minority of the overseas students in Japan failed to acquire
sufﬁcient technical knowledge, or worse, became susceptible to rad-
icalization and anti-dynasty sentiments.11Within China, a program for
the whole-scale establishment of a modern school system modeled on
that of Japan was set forth in 1904 with the ‘Regulations for the
Schools’ (Zouding Xuetang Zhangcheng), and a new central government
Board of Education (Xue Bu; the name was not changed to the more
familiar Jiaoyu Bu until 1912) was established in late 1905 to deﬁne
standards, promote modern curricula, and establish control over edu-
cation down to the level of the private country school through registra-
tion and review of examinations.12 But despite the establishment of the
10 Bailey, p. 39.
11 Reynolds, pp. 48, 58–61.
12 Borthwick, pp. 71–2, and First Historical Archives (hereafter FHA), Xue Bu
Archives, 525/19-1, Files 10–11. These two ﬁles, although from the sightly later
date of 1909–1910 well illustrate the extent to which the Xue Bu was to claim
powers of oversight and standardization; it is full of multiple drafts of regulations
to standardize teaching materials—complete with the subjects to be covered, lesson
plans, and sample lectures.
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new schools and the Board of Education for integrating them into a
national framework, serious problems remained. There was signiﬁcant
social resistance to the disestablishment of old style private schools
(sishu), modern schools were expensive andmore restrictive in terms of
access, and the Board of Education, despite its pretensions to standard
setting and regulation had virtually no ﬁscal resources by which to
enforce compliance.13
Institutionally coordinating these new sources of talent with regular
channels of recruitment into the bureaucracy required the simultan-
eous reform of the Confucian keju system and the credentialing of new
students. In theory this was a straightforward matter of gradualist
transformation of the civil service examinations to test modern sub-
jects. In practice civil service examination reform turned out to be no
less problematic a venture than securing an adequate supply of talent.
Between 1901 and 1905, keju reform proceeded in three stages:
reshaping the content of the examinations without signiﬁcant admin-
istrative restructuring (1901–03), more radical attempts to integ-
rate the modern schools with the existing keju system by gradually
shifting ofﬁcial qualiﬁcation and degree conferral to the new schools
while retaining old degree titles (1903–04), and then abrupt abroga-
tion in late 1904, with the subsequently sharp downgrading of the
status of both the Boards of Rites and Ofﬁcials.
The ﬁrst, in retrospect very modest, stage of reform remained
entirely framed by an extant literati discourse that had long criti-
cized the examinations’ uselessness in selecting men of talent for
government ofﬁce. First to go was the infamous eight-legged essay,
which was abolished as an examination subject in 1901. Second was
the strengthening of the third section of the examinations devoted
to essays on practical policy. Beginning with the 1902 examination
cycle, essays on the classics (which until then were ﬁrst and most
important) and on practical governance (previously in third position)
were transposed in rank order, and a new set of questions on foreign
politics and governance comprised the second section, to include
both Chinese and foreign systems of governance. And last was the
tentative revival of the ‘specialist examination’—ﬁrst held in 1903
at the metropolitan level to a small group on economics.14
13 Borthwick, pp. 76–7, Elman, p. 624.
14 Franke, pp. 52–3, Elman, Table 11, ‘Format of Provincial and Metropolitan
Civil Service Examinations during the late Ch’ing Dynasty after the 1901 Reform’,
p. 737.
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What is notable about this ﬁrst stage is how attempted reform of
the keju occurred by stretching the boundaries of known categories
and precedents rather than by radically bursting beyond them. It was
assumed that foreign forms of learning had to come in and provide
the new standard for assessing talent, but that this new content could
and should coexist with older forms of learning within an incre-
mentally reforming set of institutions; as long as reform occurred in
a gradualist manner, integrating incrementally reformed national
civil service examinations with a still new modern school system was
expected to proceed smoothly. But this optimism reckoned without
the resistance of conservative examiners who dragged their feet and
continued to reward policy questions that stressed ‘Chinese learning’
rather than ‘foreign learning’ irrespective of the new rank ordering
of examination subjects.15
The next set of initiatives in 1903–1904 noted the difﬁculty of
coordination between old and new systems, and stressed the import-
ance of institutionally linking the new schools with qualiﬁcations for
ofﬁce, when Zhang Zhidong and Yuan Shikai resubmitted an earlier
memorial that requested a gradual reduction of the examination
quotas and their replacement with corresponding numbers from new
schools.16 Ultimately, the locus of examination credentialing and
degree status for entry into government service was to be shifted to
a full developed network of new schools, with those who passed the
course at the higher elementary level receiving the degree of linsheng,
zensheng or fusheng; with those who graduated from middle schools to
become ba gongsheng, yu gongsheng, and sui gongsheng, those who gradu-
ated from the upper level schools (gaodeng xuexiao) to receive the juren
degree, and those who studied abroad or at the Imperial University
to be awarded the jinshi.17
The stage was now set for the abrupt—and to all unexpected—
abrogation of the old style keju in the wake of the Russo-Japanese
War of 1904–1905. While this crisis was international in scope,
15 See Elman, pp. 596–601 on the ways in which examiners slanted their assess-
ments on the modern policy questions to reinforce ‘Chinese learning’.
16 A full translation of this memorial and its corresponding edict is in Franke,
59–64. Interestingly, this memorial dealt at some length with the sticky problem of
how to compensate the many thousands who had spent their lifetimes studying the
wrong curriculum. Shengyuan under the age of 30 were eligible for immediate entry
into the new schools; those between 30 and 50 for new normal schools. Those with
juren status were eligible to enter government service via examination into the ranks
of copyists or receive appointments as assistant department magistrates.
17 Franke, p. 66.
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it was in large part played out on Qing territory. Coming so soon
after the Boxer Debacle and widespread fears that China was
likely to be carved into colonies, this sudden intrusion of belliger-
ents triggered pained awareness of the empire’s continued defens-
ive fragility. This in turn shocked the perameters of the xinzheng
internal discourse on keju reform out of incremental gradualism
and into rapid decisive action: immediate abrogation of an exam-
ination regime that was ill suited to China’s urgent requirements
(although the examination cycle then underway was allowed to
proceed to completion).18
The sudden abrogation, decisive as it was after years of discussion
and months of incremental keju reform, did not resolve any of the
outstanding issues that had put a drag on the pace of reform in the
ﬁrst place: how to accommodate the thousands who had invested
lifetimes investing educational resources in a now obsolete standard,
how new standards would be set, how a new ‘regular path’ to govern-
ment service would be established, and how ‘virtue and talent’ would
be henceforth deﬁned and evaluated.
After Abrogation: the Post-1905 Reinvention of Keju
What is most astonishing about the so-called abolition of the civil
service examinations in 1904 is that within two years different wings
of the central government found it necessary to revive something
that looked very much like civil service examinations. Centrally sanc-
tioned examinations of one sort or another held in every year
between 1906 and the fall of the dynasty (when preparations for yet
another round of examinations were underway).19
These post-1905 examinations differed from the pre-1905 keju
system, and for all their temporal continuity with the keju system,
they anticipated the future in important ways. When the Board of
Rites lost control over this important sphere of state standardization
and selection, the ad hoc functionalism of examinations ensued.
Rather than providing a proactive standard of generalist achieve-
ment from which ofﬁcials would be selected, the post-1905 examina-
tions were fundamentally reactive in nature. They were designed to
18 See Yuan Shikai/Zhang Zhidong memorial in Qingchao xu wenxian tongkao, juan
87, xuanju 4, pp. 8455–7.
19 Elman, p. 613.
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keep some sort of regular path to government ofﬁce in operation,
and as such attempted to fulﬁl a number of sub-goals: 1) setting
minimal common standards for prospective ofﬁcials now streaming
to prospective public service from a hodgepodge of different back-
grounds; 2) ameliorating the worst of the confusion due to the abrupt
abrogation at the end of 1904, and 3) providing a gatekeeping func-
tion to overcome ongoing structural problems of quality control in
the new schools. It was bad enough that many of the graduates from
new schools had uncertain standards and qualiﬁcations. Even worse
was the uncomfortable reality that there were far more appropriately
degreed graduates from the new schools than there were available
positions in the bureaucracy. The sudden obliteration of the previous
keju standard did not do away with the long-standing bottleneck of
aspiring ofﬁcials waiting for a restricted number of positions; if any-
thing the sudden ﬂux and uncertainty in the question of standards
and qualiﬁcations seems to have made the bottlenecks worse. As
early as mid 1907, the Ministry of Rites noted with some alarm that
‘for the provincial level examinations there were already three times
as many [qualiﬁed individuals] as there were open positions’—and
that another [supplementary] examination had to be held ‘as quickly
as possible to determine positions’.20
In theory, the Board of Education (Xue Bu) took over all the cre-
dentialing, assessment, and therefore examining necessary for both
the educational sector and recruitment into the bureaucracy; it was
formally placed above the Ministry of Rites in 1906, when the lat-
ter’s remit was drastically curtailed. And in fact, the Board of Educa-
tion did take a lead (either directly or indirectly) in organizing many
of the examinations that were offered between 1906 and 1912.
During these years the Board of Education set year-end examination
standards for the new schools. From 1907 on, it also organized
annual examinations for returning students, particularly returning
students from Japan, as well as frequent (re)examinations for you
xuesheng (students who passed the modern school examinations, but
who were still ‘drifting’ in search of formal appointments) to revalid-
ate original school-leaving examinations, and additional special sit-
tings of examinations for juren from the pre-1905 keju regime. These
annual (re)validation examinations paralleled the zige kaoshi
20 FHA 490 20-1/ File 18. Communication from Board of Rites to Board of Agri-
culture, Industry and Commerce, received on Guangxu 33, 4th lunar month.
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(qualiﬁcation examinations) of the Republic. Through these quali-
ﬁcation examinations, the state retroactively claimed symbolic unity
and the uniﬁcation of standards, but the centralized qualiﬁcation
standard examinations themselves were progressively institutionally
de-linked from the provision of ofﬁcial positions.
But another type of examination held by the post-keju Qing state
was not merely symbolic and retroactive. While much work remains
to be done on this topic, some of the more functionally oriented
newly re-organized and ‘modernized’ central organizations of the
state began to hold their own appointment examinations (renyong
kaoshi) within two years of the abrogation. Luca Gabbiani’s paper in
this special section describes not one, but two examinations held by
the Board of Civilian Affairs for registrars and clerks; the ﬁrst in
what seems to have been an ad hoc manner to ﬁll posts shortly after
the establishment of the Board in 1907 and a second, evidently
better organized examination of 1910, deliberately timed to coincide
with the large numbers of ofﬁce seekers who had ﬂocked to Beijing
for the general metropolitan examinations of late 1909.21 Although
the details are sketchy, there were similarly specialized examina-
tions, albeit at a probable higher level of entry, for the Supreme
Court of Justice [Da Liyuan] for which a special examination was
held in 1910, and the Board of the Army.
Yet another model halfway between the complete control held by
the Education Board (for returned and most ‘drifting’ students) and
the seemingly complete autonomy held by the Board of Civil Affairs
in its examinations of 1907 and 1910 was an informal collaboration
between the Board of Agriculture/Industry/Commerce and the Board
of Education. This institutionally anticipated similar informal coor-
dination between the National Government Examination Yuan and
specialized functional ministries in the 1930s and 1940s. In both
cases, functional organizations did not hold their own examinations
per se, but were expected to ‘send over’ their experts to sit on a
special xiangshi weiyuanhui (assistant examination committee) to
advise the generalist examination body on appropriate questions and
to do the eventual grading of the examinations. Thus as early as the
autumn of 1907, a functionally special examination was held to
21 Luca Gabbiani, ‘The redemption of the rascals: the Xinzheng Reforms and the
Transformation of the Status of Lower Level Central Administration Personnel’,
Paper prepared for the AAS Annual Meeting, Washington, DC, April 2002, pp. 11–
13 in manuscript text.
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check on ‘drifting students’ ’ (you xuesheng) ‘depth of scientiﬁc know-
ledge’ in agriculture, industry and commerce.22
Whether Board of Education controlled, directly administered by
functional boards to recruit for their own needs, or through some
combination of the two, the institutional link between examination
success and substantive appointment was clearly becoming weaker
in the post 1904 xinzheng era. Like the Examination Yuan some
twenty-odd years later, the late Qing Board of Education seems to
have had no direct say in whom or how many of the individuals it
‘properly’ credentialed would be appointed. While in theory the Li
Bu (Board of Ofﬁcials) still had this remit, there is scant evidence
that in practice this was exercised with any uniformity after 1905.
Like the Guomindang era Ministry of Personnel it preceded, the late
xinzheng Li Bu was at most able to request that properly credentialed
examinees be considered for positions.23
National level, open civil service examinations still held symbolic
importance, but there is little to suggest that the various examina-
tions between 1906 and 1911 held by the Education Board for ‘drift-
ing’ students, returned students, or old-style juren systematically
resulted in ofﬁcial appointment. By the last few years of the dynasty,
these examinations were increasingly institutionally de-linked from
actual appointment, and were well on the way to becoming mere
‘credential exams’ (zige kaoshi) rather than ‘appointment exams’
(renyong kaoshi)—a perennial sore point for the many who passed the
exams and waited in vain for an ofﬁcial position, both in the late
Qing and after.24
The second notable difference between the ad hoc examination
system of 1906–1911 and its more formalized and regular keju prede-
cessor was the increasing variety in the types of people who were
examined, and the subsequent proliferation of non-commensurate
topics that nevertheless required ex post facto state validation. Left-
over juren, returned students from Japan and elsewhere, legal special-
ists, and for that matter the ever larger numbers passing through
the modern school system with now seriously debased minor degrees
had been educated to wildly different standards in a plethora of sub-
22 FHA 490/ 20-1 (Board of Agriculture, Industry and Commerce Archives), File
#18. Document dated Guangxu 33, 8th Lunar month.
23 FHA 490/20-1, File 18. Communication from Li Bu to Nong/Gong/Shang Bu,
dated Xuantong 3, 4th Lunar month.
24 See my ‘The Examination Yuan in the 1930s: Symbol and Reﬂection of the
Reconstituting State’, Modern China 20:2, April 1994, p. 218.
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ject matter. The function of the examinations was to establish a
minimal form of quality control and ideological conformity, but what
stands out is how the subjects being tested to a putatively uniform
standard were as non-commensurate as apples, oranges, and pears.
In 1909–10 alone, the Education Board held two fundamentally
different kinds of examinations: a general exam for provincial gradu-
ates of present fusheng, linsheng, gongsheng, yu gongsheng, and zengsheng
status that seems to have been geared towards the acquisition of
secretarial (shuji) status. Extant examination essays from 1909–10
suggest that examinees came from throughout the country, ranged
in age from 19 to more than 50, but with the majority in their 20s,
and were vouched for by established ofﬁcials in other government
bodies, typically other central government organizations.25
The questions on this examination requested discourses on state-
craft topics with only slightly modern twists: ‘Government cannot
exist without adequate ﬁnance’; ‘Ministers cannot lose righteousness
as long as they don’t part from the Way’; ‘selection of talented men
is a contemporary matter; one cannot borrow talent from different
eras’. No indication is given as to how difﬁcult the examination was
to pass, but the answers that were rewarded suggested that being
well versed in the classical curriculum and history was merely the
ﬁrst hurdle; to excel required that one also be able to apply that
classical learning to contemporary affairs. The standard referred to
by examiners indicated that intellectual rigor and diplomacy in com-
municating even harsh words with grace, ability to convince, and
clarity of calligraphy were the most important features in
assessment.26
The implicit expectation that the aspiring ofﬁcial be thoroughly
grounded in classical Chinese culture and philosophy while able to
apply that culture and philosophy to the contemporary world was the
way of the future. Apart from the use of full classical Chinese rather
25 FHA 525/19-1 (Board of Education), File 1. Examination Papers, File 1 (of 6).
In this box, there were 120 examination papers from Xuantong 2. The majority of
these examinations were without names or comment, but a minority of eleven still
had original slips that conﬁrmed name and basic biographical information (age,
native place, prior highest degree achieved, and the name, status and institution of
the guarantor). These eleven hailed from Jiangxi, Shuntian, Shandong, Henan,
Anhui, Hunan, Sichuan and Jiangsu. Another sitting of the same examination in
File/ boxes 5–6 suggest that another group had at least 300 examinees, drawn from
somewhat different provinces, including Zhili.
26 FHA 525/19-1, Files 1, 3, and 5 contain examinations with different questions;
box 5 contains evaluation criteria.
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than the hybrid mix of vernacular and classical Chinese that became
the norm for documentary Chinese in the Republican period, there
was little difference between the questions asked on the late xinzheng
period examination and those on the general (guowen) component of
the gaokao (upper civil service examination) and the gaokao waijiao
lingshi guan (upper civil service foreign service consular examination)
of the 1930s.
At the same time, though, the late Qing Board of Education held
a very different kind of examination for a much smaller and special-
ized cadre of returned students and ‘drifting’ students. For these
examinations, both the questions asked and indeed the languages in
which the questions were asked could not have been more different.
This second type of examination was in turn sub-divided into three
groups, two for returned students and the other for regular ‘drifting’
students. All groups were tested on modern subjects of their choice:
either law (falu¨, fazheng ke) or commerce and economics (shangke).
The former included contemporary policy questions in Chinese and
either Japanese or French, as well as a straight foreign language
test; the latter included compulsory questions on general economic
theory and governance (in French), mathematics, and general policy
in Chinese. It isn’t entirely clear whether the regular ‘drifting stu-
dents’ had to sit the same questions (minus the language
requirement) as the returned students with a choice of law, govern-
ment and law, or commerce and economics, but they certainly had
to answer a mix of general questions that ranged from the heavily
classical (‘How should the gentleman cultivate healthy habits in the
people?’) to the mixture of classical-with-contemporary-applications
seen in the shuji examination above (‘Education is the ﬁrst principle
in building the country’).27 With only slight changes in the wording,
these questions, too, could have been offered on the generalist and
special subject gaokao of the 1930s and 1940s—despite the changed
political context of the central Party-state.28 When provided with
anything other than an implacably hostile state in which to operate,
key features of this literati high culture continued to exhibit remark-
27 FHA 525/19-1. File 2.
28 Although the political vocabulary differs slightly, as does the stress on the pri-
macy of the Party-state in making all well and good, the sample examination ques-
tions in the Gaodeng Kaoshi [Putong Xingzheng Renyuan, Caiwu Xingzheng Renyuan, Wai-
jiao Guanling Renyuan] Kaoshi Quanshu (Shanghai: Sanmin Tushu Gongsi, 1935) are
striking in their similarity to the examination questions of a quarter of a century
before in the last years of the Qing.
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able tenacity. It managed to survive several decades of institutional
fracturing, to eventually reinsert itself in an only modestly updated
fashion once there was an even semi-viable central state in existence
to attach to.
Examinations and Historical Afterlives in the Twentieth
Century
The xinzheng consensus that did away with the Confucian civil service
examinations in late 1904 discovered, ex post facto, that getting rid of
the keju only revealed how much something very like the keju was
necessary for the functioning of the state. (The epitaph of 1904
might have read: ‘The keju is dead; long live the keju.’) Why was this?
What accounts for the extraordinary staying power of the ‘examina-
tion life’ despite the ‘decanonization’ of both examinations and clas-
sical curriculum during the xinzheng era and the subsequent collapse
of the central state in the early Republic? Or, put slightly differently,
how could open civil service examinations be so abruptly ‘decanon-
ized’ while still preserving enough legitimacy to keep popping up,
hydra like, every time a central state strong enough to institute them
came into existence for the remainder of the Republican era?29
There may be no deﬁnitive answer to this question, but it is likely
that a combination of practical efﬁcacy, positive legitimacy, and suf-
ﬁcient malleability kept the idea of examinations closely linked to
the evolution of the modern Chinese state. As a practical matter, an
examination regime gave the state a way to keep the numbers
swarming to take up positions in the bureaucracy to manageable
numbers, to establish quality control, and perhaps most importantly,
to ground itself on long established principles of legitimacy to the
educated: through fair provision of a career ‘open to talent’ through
a ‘regular path’ to ofﬁce. These practical and legitimating functions
had of course always been intimately bound up with the keju and they
did not suddenly disappear at the end of 1904.
What did irrevocably disappear at this time was the late imperial
standardization of content as examinations began to accommodate
a diverse set of ‘new subjects’. In focusing so entirely on increasingly
technically deﬁned forms of ‘talent’, the ﬁeld of ‘virtue’ was almost
29 I take the idea of decanonization from Elman’s title of Chapter 11, ‘Delegit-
imation and Decanonization’.
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entirely ceded to schools or other extra-examination sources. And
with the loss of generalist, standardized content came the ﬁrst signs
of procedural fraying, even within the different organizations of the
central government, as the Board of Ofﬁcials increasingly had to
request that Board of Education qualiﬁed individuals get a look in
for new appointments, and as individual functional boards found it
simpler to directly recruit for their own empty positions; trends that
would accelerate in the Republican period.
The ad hoc way in which the post-1905 examinations were held,
their increasing diversity in subject matter, and the ways in which
central examining and appointing organizations were beginning to
lose control over the process even within the central government all
pointed to the post-1911 future; one in which effectively functioning
civil service examination systems were as much a reﬂection of extant
state power as they were a means to achieve it. Republican era
regimes from Yuan Shikai through post-1949 Taiwan would all
struggle with the hard choices of realpolitik that made it so difﬁcult
to enforce these ideals. But the ideal of the career open to talent
and fair and meritocratic bases for recruitment into state service
remained, as did the practical and functional reasons for having
these methods of recruitment. And over the very long run of the
twentieth century, the combination of positively charged ideal and
practical mechanism for dampening down patronage while selecting
for technocratic talent proved compelling enough for open civil ser-
vice examinations to be revived—even in the People’s Republic in
the 1990s.
